Governmental Mobility: The Power Effects of the Movement of Detained Asylum Seekers around Britain's Detention Estate by Gill, N
 1 
Governmental Mobility: The Power Effects of the Movement of Detained Asylum 
Seekers Around Britain’s Detention Estate 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the ways in which mobility can have governmental effects in the 
context of the management of asylum seekers awaiting deportation from the UK. 
Drawing upon the case of Campsfield House Immigration Removal Centre, a facility for 
the incarceration of immigration deportees near Oxford, the paper makes the case that 
the way asylum seekers are moved between detention centres within the UK has 
implications for the way they are represented to both asylum activists and asylum sector 
employees, causing them to choose to use their influence differently by with-holding the 
support that they might otherwise provide. The constant moving and repositioning of 
asylum seekers means that they are depicted as transitory, fleeting and depersonalised to 
those actors with the greatest degree of influence over them. The subjection not only of 
asylum seekers through forceful, blunt forms of power, but also of more powerful asylum 
sector actors through subtler, governmental techniques, has significant material 
implications for the incarcerated asylum seeking community that populates Britain’s 
detention estate. 
 
Keywords: Mobility, Governmentality, Asylum Seekers, Detention, Removal 
Centres, Incarceration 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Geographers have long been interested in the influences that space and time can exert 
over the ways in which social actors choose to conduct themselves (Allen, 1997, Philo, 
1992, Soja, 1989). Time-space, they have argued, is not a passive container of social 
practice or a mere backdrop against which social events play out. Rather, the timings and 
spacings of people and institutions have their own social effects (Lefebvre, 1991, Soja, 
1996). For some, these effects proceed from the ways in which the actual, physical 
location of objects and events encroaches upon the horizon of possible activities in which 
social agents can engage (Mills and Hamilton, 1994). For others however, the social 
effects of time and space are achieved not only by delimiting what is possible through the 
blunt constraints imposed by distance and delay, but also by influencing what is 
perceived, pursued and desired, through processes that suggest when and when not to 
respond to a given social event (Elden, 2007, Hannah, 2000, Huxley, 2007). If social 
events are particularly frequent or proximate, for example, this raises their perceived 
salience and demands a response or reaction, whilst sporadic or distant social events are 
more likely to be overlooked. Over time, this produces an ordering of social events in the 
mind of an individual. The spacing and timing of social life can, therefore, be seen to 
have a psychological effect by amplifying or softening the visibility of social phenomena 
(Gregory, 2004, Said, 1979). 
 
The recent increase in interest in mobility begs the question of how the mobilities agenda 
relates to geographers’ sensitivity to the presentational properties of time and space 
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(Blunt, 2007). One contribution that geographers can make is to draw attention to the way 
that mobility represents social reality in particular, subjective ways. This suggestion 
builds upon discussion of mobility by a range of academics (Hannam et al., 2006, Larsen 
et al., 2006, Sheller and Urry, 2006). Mobility here is not treated as a social outcome but 
as a process of representation. Along with an interest in mobility per se, it is appropriate 
to develop an interest in the representative effects of mobility, drawing upon the lineage 
of work in geography that is attentive to the socially representative, suggestive effects of 
timings and spacings (Elden, 2007, Gregory, 2004, Lefebvre, 1991, Soja, 1989). 
 
The depiction of asylum seekers in the printed press has received widespread academic 
criticism and been associated with a range of negative consequences for asylum seekers 
themselves (Finney and Robinson, 2007, Kaye, 2001, Kessler, 2001, Mollard, 2001, 
Speers, 2001, Thielemann, 2004, Boswell, 2003). In the particular context of the 
detention of asylum seekers in the UK, Mallock and Stanley (2005) draw out the 
connections between aggressive media reporting of asylum seekers and the use of 
detention as a punitive system of immigrant disciplining in response to public fears 
surrounding forced migrants. The media is not, moreover, the only way in which asylum 
seekers are depicted. Outside of popular media accounts of asylum seekers, a range of 
academic studies have drawn attention to the subjective representation of asylum seekers 
in policy discourse (Schuster, 2003), institutional cultures (Düvell and Jordan, 2003), the 
language used to describe asylum seekers and their situations (Turton, 2003) and activist 
promotional material (Malkki, 1996).  
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The representation of foreigners in subjective ways has, from an historical perspective, 
been related to a deeper social unease about foreignness and an abiding association of the 
foreigner with disorder, chaos and threats to existing geo-political arrangements (Weber 
and Bowling, 2008). Such representations tend to be most marked in times of geo-
political turmoil, when anxiety about the unknown is at its most pronounced. In this 
regard, the current epoch of globalisation shares with previous rounds of spatio-temporal 
global restructuring a tendency to single out suspect bodies and to contribute towards 
their separation through the disciplinary use of both mobility and controls over mobility 
(Weber and Bowling, 2008). As a case in point, the use of dispersal strategies in Britain, 
under which asylum seekers are required to travel to far-flung areas of the country if they 
are to receive subsistence support from the state, creates an impression of an asylum 
population that is both copious, due to their geographical dispersion, and burdensome, 
due to their routine location in areas of the country that offer cheap housing in precisely 
those areas that can ill-afford to support vulnerable immigrants who are prohibited from 
finding work and supporting themselves (Schuster, 2005). 
 
One theme linking these studies is the effect that subjective representations and 
depictions of asylum seekers have over ostensibly objective actors who have influence 
over the determination of asylum seekers’ claims for asylum or their welfare during their 
time in the UK. This paper argues that subjective depictions of asylum seekers exert a 
particular type of power over these influential actors, which causes them to treat asylum 
seekers in different ways without forcing them or overtly incentivising them to do so. It is 
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in this sense that it is appropriate to develop an interest in the governmental influences 
over asylum sector actors. 
 
Governmental power is taken to mean influence over the dispositions of actors (Foucault, 
1991). As opposed to power that either appeals to an actor’s interests, or over-rides their 
interests, both of which treat these interests as exogenous, governmental power refers to 
power that re-casts interests, affecting the desires and aspirations of an actor and 
endogenising interests themselves into the realm of what is contestable and subject to 
determination by powerful factions (Lukes, 2005). This represents a significant move 
away from neo-classical models of agency which see individual interests as immutable. 
Rather, the importance of what Rose and Miller call ‘techniques’ that are capable of 
inducing within subjects particular desires or aspirations is what is at stake in a 
governmental analysis (Rose and Miller, 1992). This link between psychological factors 
and governmental power has been emphasised in work concerned with the operation  of 
‘governmentality’: the orchestration of conduct that is nevertheless volitional (Foucault, 
1991). 
 
Drawing upon thirteen interviews with activists and employees in and around 
Campsfield, this paper contends that the mobility of asylum seekers around the detention 
estate affects both groups, encouraging, although not forcing, them to treat the asylum 
seekers under their influence in ways that increase the chances of their eventual exclusion 
from the UK. Mobility can thereby by understood as a governmental technique that acts 
upon this ostensibly powerful population. 
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Campsfield House in rural Oxfordshire is one of thirteen facilities that, together, 
constitute the ‘detention estate’ of the UK with a total capacity of 2663 places, excluding 
facilities to hold families (See Map One). 
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Map One: The UK’s Detention Estate 
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Source: adapted from capacity and postcode information given by National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns, 
correct 11th February 2009 (http://www.ncadc.org.uk/about/capacity.html). Excludes smaller, short term holding 
facilities in Manchester, Harwich and Dover Harbour. Colnbrook and Kalyx are separate removal centres at very 
similar postcodes so are represented together here. 
 
One of the most noticeable trends in asylum seekers’ incarceration in recent years has 
been the extent to which asylum seekers are increasingly moved between detention 
centres. In 2004/5, the most recent financial year for which figures are available, the 
British state spent over £6.5 million simply moving detainees from one secure facility to 
another within the UK (author's calculations from Hansard, 5th December 2005, Hansard, 
9th January 2006). 
 
While the rationale for these movements and the implications that they hold for asylum 
seekers will be discussed, this paper will focus upon the effect this degree of forced 
mobility has on the ways charity workers, asylum activists and detention centre managers 
choose to treat the asylum seekers under their influence. In focusing upon the 
governmental effect of the mobility of asylum seekers around the detention estate, the 
study addresses an area that has hitherto received relatively little attention. There has 
been a great deal of literature examining the implications of the government-orchestrated 
spatial and temporal organisation of asylum seekers for asylum seekers themselves 
(Chapman, 1999, Cornelius, 2005, Fekete, 2005, Thielemann, 2004, Van Hear, 2004). 
Less work, however, has considered the implications of the organised mobility of asylum 
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seekers for those who manage them, make decisions about them, ensure their well-being, 
and advocate or demonstrate on their behalf. While it is clear that the movement of 
asylum seekers has consequences for asylum applicants in terms of disruption and 
inconvenience (and it is certainly not the intention to detract from these impositions here) 
less attention has been paid to the way in which this mobility has the secondary, ancillary 
effect of presenting asylum seekers as more transient and fleeting to those actors that 
have an influence over their experiences. 
 
The following section introduces Campsfield House, the system of intra-detention estate 
movement is examined in Section Three and the governmental effect of this system are 
examined in Sections Four and Five respectively. The paper concludes with a call to give 
spacings, timings and mobilities their proper places in the growing list of representative 
techniques that underpin governmental power. 
 
 
CAMPSFIELD HOUSE IMMIGRATION REMOVAL CENTRE 
 
The British practice of incarcerating immigrants has been in place since at least 1993, and 
has increased in sophistication through the development of contracting business models 
whereby private companies assume the day-to-day operation of an increasing proportion 
of the centres (see Bacon, 2005). This legacy of immigrant incarceration facilities, 
coupled with the layers of private accountability to public bureaucracy that surround it, 
serves to normalise and routinise the incarceration of immigrants. In Sidaway’s terms, 
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despite the prima facie unsettling characteristics of immigration detention, the practice 
has become banal, with a focus more upon its operationalisation than upon its 
justification (Sidaway, 2003). It is precisely this banality that can reduce individuals 
within detention systems to mere numbers, positioning them in passive and vulnerable 
roles. This in turn opens the possibility to individuals becoming lost in carceral 
environments, constantly being moved so that their presence is always passing, fleeting 
and ghostly. Indeed, the possibility that the continual movement of detainees to reduce 
their visibility has become a government strategy, a process referred to as ‘ghosting’ 
(Wilson, 2008), has been raised in the light of apparent evidence of an international 
network of unacknowledged detention centres run by the American government (so-
called CIA ‘black sites’) (Amnesty International 2007). 
 
 
Campsfield House has the capacity to intern 198 detainees. The facility is located in a 
secluded rural area, surrounded by fields on all sides. Access is provided by a long 
service road through a wooded area that screens the facility from public view. Security is 
extremely tight (see Photograph One), including pervasive CCTV monitoring; thorough 
checking and searching of all visitors and employees; guards patrolling the 12-foot high 
razor-wire-topped perimeter fence; heightened observation of detainees perceived to pose 
a risk of disturbance or self-harm; five steel security doors between the outside world and 
the detainees; an isolation unit; a segregation unit and the sanctioned use of forceful 
control and restraint procedures. 
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Photograph 1: Campsfield House 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Campaign to Close Campsfield 2007 
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The facility was converted from a youth detention centre in 1993. The composition of the 
detainee population in Campsfield varies according to Home Office targets but the largest 
national groups at the time of the Prison Inspection in 2002 were Albanian, Indian, 
Jamaican and Yugoslav (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2002). 
 
Access to the centre was secured through two strategies. First, rather than the usual 
strategy of snowballing from the bottom to the top of an organization, some senior 
figures were asked to participate in the research from the outset. This was because while 
lower ranked officials might be fearful of management reprisals if they discussed the 
centre, senior figures had the authority to waive secrecy clauses. This strategy proved 
successful, with three management level interviews secured at the centre. The second 
strategy was to access the centre’s administrative structure by snowballing from the 
asylum advocacy groups that operated around it, with which I already has some personal 
contact. While it might be expected that asylum advocates and management staff at the 
centre had an antagonistic relationship, and certainly this was true in some cases, in 
general the relationship inside and outside of the removal centre was surprisingly 
supportive. Both management and asylum advocates had as one of their goals the 
improvement of conditions for detainees so, at least to some extent, co-operation suited 
both parties. External charities would sometimes be invited into the centre to provide 
entertainment, advice or friendship to the detainees, which involved a degree of co-
ordination and the development of a necessary understanding between management and 
pro-asylum groups. For this reason I was able to snowball within the organization from 
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the groups ostensible both outside it and opposed to it. The composition of the group of 
research participants reflects these strategies (Table One). 
Table One: Details of Sources and Participants  
Source 1 Campaign to Close Campsfield Promotional Leaflet entitled ‘Close 
Campsfield: Oxford’s Own Crime Against Humanity’ 
Source 2 Voluntary advisor to detainees who has worked in and around the centre for 
over five years. 
Source 3 Local pro-asylum activist. 
Source 4 Management level professional, Campsfield IRC. 
Source 5 Volunteer with Oxford-based asylum advocacy organization. 
Source 6 Email statement from management level professional, Campsfield IRC. 
Source 7 Email interview with managerial-level professional. Had worked at another 
detention facility for over twelve months and frequently visited Campsfield 
IRC. 
Source 8 Former detainee at Campsfield House IRC. 
Source 9 Former detainee at Campsfield House IRC. 
Source 10 Management-level professional, Campsfield IRC. 
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Source 11 Bail for Immigration Detainees volunteer. 
Source 12 Management level professional, Campsfield IRC. 
Source 13 Religious Leader and Asylum Activist 
Source 14 Student pro-asylum activist 
 
Of the participants, 54% (7 of 13) were contacted through snowballing, with another 38% 
(5 of 13) contacted through cold calling and one interviewee an existing personal contact. 
Also significant was the high proportion of interviews that were conducted in a public 
place, at the request of the interviewee, rather than either at work or at home 62% (8 of 
13), the number of interviewees who additional consent to use the interview notes in any 
way other than for academic purposes which was 72% (10 of 13) and the number of 
interviewees who declined to be recorded using a Dictaphone 23% (3 of 13). These 
factors indicate the politically sensitive nature of the topic under discussion and the fact 
that some of the contributors to the research were taken a degree of personal risk in order 
to participate. 
 
The asylum seekers incarcerated in Campsfield and elsewhere in the detention estate are 
not held under criminal law, but as the result of an administrative decision taken by 
civilian immigration officials (Weber, 2003). They have not been charged with an 
offence, they are not awaiting trial and they do not know the length of their incarceration 
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(Schuster, 2005). The centre is privately run on a government contract that is periodically 
tendered. The company in charge of the centre at the time of this research was Global 
Solutions Limited (GSL), who lost their contract to a lower bid from a competitor, Global 
Enterprise on Outsourcing (GEO), in the summer of 2006. The imperative to cut costs 
reflects the fact that the management of detention centres is an expensive business. In 
response to a parliamentary question in 2001, the cost of detention in the UK was stated 
to range from £364 per detainee per week to £1620 (Hansard, 25th October 2001). 
 
The rationale for removal centres is two-fold. First, the detainees represent those 
considered to be most likely to ‘go underground’ in an attempt to avoid deportation if 
they are not incarcerated. The second rationale is that these asylum seekers’ deportations 
are imminent. In theory, every asylum seeker in Campsfield has reached the end of the 
legal asylum-claiming process and has received a negative final decision. In 2002 the 
centre was renamed from a ‘detention’ centre to a ‘removal’ centre in order to reflect this 
operational objective. 
 
Both rationales are debateable. When a Select Committee on Home Affairs examined the 
practice of detention during 2003 they expressed concern that 
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Many of those labelled absconders are in fact people who, once their claims have been 
rejected and benefits withdrawn, have in the absence of any attempt to remove them 
drifted elsewhere in search of work. 
Fourth Report, Select Committee on Home Affairs, 2003, para. 66 
 
Of the small number of academic studies carried out into the subject, Bruegel and 
Natamba (2002) used the records of Bail for Immigration Detainees (BID), a registered 
charity, to trace ninety-eight asylum detainees who were bailed between July 2000 and 
October 2001. They found that over 90% of those released kept their bail conditions 
despite only 7% receiving a favourable final legal decision on their claim. This seemed to 
suggest that nine out of ten participants were incarcerated unnecessarily. Similarly, in 
tracing asylum seekers granted temporary admission, Weber and Gelsthorpe (2000) 
found that, for the ports covered in their research, absconding rates varied between 3% 
and 12%, again indicating a high degree of inefficiency because as many as 97% of 
asylum seekers due for deportation did not abscond. According to Bacon (2005: 5), citing 
a report by Dunston (1994), 
 
A rare acknowledgement of the low rate of absconding among asylum seekers was made 
by the Home Office Minister in 1995, who informed parliament that of the 37,120 
persons who were refused asylum in the three-year period 1992-94, only 220 were 
known to have absconded, the equivalent of 0.59 per cent. 
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The second rationale for the incarceration of asylum seekers is that they are awaiting 
immediate deportation. This did not tally, however, with the accounts of activists in and 
around the centre. For example, one activist promotional leaflet (Source 1) claimed that 
‘Less than half of those detained are liable to removal or deportation; many, if not most, 
await an initial decision on their asylum application’. This was corroborated by my own 
interviewees: 
 
NG:  How many asylum seekers are still appealing or still have legal issues? 
Source 3:  They shouldn’t have if they are in a removal centre but they do have because 
the Home Office will remove people before they’ve come to the end of their appeal. That will 
happen time and time again. 
 
 
Even the staff at the centre concede that a number of asylum seekers come to the centre 
directly upon reaching the UK. This indicates that asylum seekers’ claims are, in some 
cases, entirely determined during their incarceration. Given that, in principle, they are not 
liable for deportation before their case is determined, this indicates that some of the 
asylum seekers incarcerated are not, in fact, ‘awaiting deportation’ at all. In response to 
the question ‘Do you get quite a few that come straight here?’ one manger remarked: 
 
Source 4: We do get them, yeah, a fair few. People have been in detention for months 
but say “I’ve never seen England”. We bring them some pictures of it and so they might 
have been here for four or five months and have no idea what it’s like. 
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In general, there is acknowledgement among both staff and asylum advocates that 
Campsfield is holding asylum seekers whose legal claims for asylum are still being 
considered, contrary to the objectives of a ‘removal’ centre. It is also worth noting the 
governmental effect that this labeling can have. Detainees who are confronted by the fact 
that they are in a removal centre may become profoundly disheartened at the apparent 
dismissal of their claims before they have actually been processed. As one activist 
outlined: 
Source 2: There are still many, many people in Campsfield who either haven’t had even 
an initial refusal or have ongoing cases. You know, lots of people get let out and end up 
getting refugee status. It comes as a huge shock to people to find themselves locked 
up when they hope they’ve found a place of safety and it must be particularly awful to 
get to this place when it’s called a ‘Removal Centre’ when they’ve just arrived. 
 
The labeling of the centre can act to undermine the motivation of asylum seekers held 
within it in pursuing their cases. To the extent that such effects are not forceful or 
coercive, but nevertheless act upon the dispositions and motivations of detained subjects 
(Rose and Miller, 1992), the relabeling of the centre can be seen to have important 
governmental implications. 
 
There is, unsurprisingly, a deep sense of injustice running throughout Campsfield. 
Management has consequently faced considerable resistance from outside, and within, 
the centre. From outside, the asylum advocacy community that operates around 
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Campsfield includes BID, who attempt to facilitate bail for the detainees; Asylum 
Welcome, a charity that organises visits to the centre; Oxford University’s Student 
Action for Refugees (STAR) who provide periodic workshops for detainees; and the 
Campaign to Close Campsfield, the most overtly political advocacy group that has 
regular contact with the Centre in the form of noisy, monthly demonstrations at its gates. 
 
From inside, Campsfield’s detainees have a long history of protest and resistance. As 
early as 1994 Algerian detainees went on hunger strike in response to their treatment, 
mounting rooftop protests, flying home-made banners and starting fires (Campaign to 
Close Campsfield, 2007). In 1997 fifty to sixty detainees escaped into a courtyard and 
protested loudly in response to the harsh treatment of their fellow inmates. Nine of these 
protesters were brought to trial as a result, yet embarrassingly for the then-management, a 
public enquiry ruled that the charges against them were without foundation (Hayter, 
2004). Since then, Campsfield has been the site of hunger strikes, more rooftop protests, a 
catalogue of public appeals from within the centre and repeated self-harm and suicide 
attempts. In June 2008 seven escapees evaded capture over-night in the local area (BBC 
News Online, 2008). 
 
In response to the difficulty of subduing the Campsfield inmates, the centre employs a 
range of innovations. The use of force is sanctioned as a way to control or deter particular 
behaviours, despite difficulties in regulating its use (MFCVT, 2004). Subtler mechanisms 
of control include a range of rewards and sanctions to promote compliant behaviour 
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without the need to resort to force. Sanctions include, for example, isolation and 
segregation or the withdrawal of privileges such as library access, gym access and the 
purchasing of luxury items. ‘Rewards’ include five pounds a week for detainees who 
keep their rooms tidy. 
 
It is policies such as these that can propagate an image of detainees as child-like and 
dependent. The operation of sanction and reward mechanisms positions the detainees as 
subjects that can be legitimately disciplined, and centre employees themselves as 
paternalistic, which can have its own consequences in fostering a condescending view of 
detainees among the management staff. In this sense, the treatment of detainees as 
disciplined and sanctioned subjects acts to alter the dispositions of the staff towards 
them, thereby constituting a governmental impact of the sanction and reward 
mechanisms. As one interviewee outlined: 
 
Source 14: I’ve seen some staff being quite friendly and quite nice to the detainees 
but often, well, I find their way of being friendly a bit patronizing. For instance when 
we went and did [a workshop with the detainees] they would come and talk to us 
afterwards and tell us how good it was we kind of came there and let [the detainees] 
do some things. I can’t really explain it but just … kind of the way you’d make kids do 
something creative and good for them. I mean, they were being friendly but it was 
very clear that they were working above these people. 
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INTRA-DETENTION ESTATE MOVEMENT OF DETAINEES 
 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the reward and sanction system to be introduced has 
been the movement of detainees around the various detention facilities of the UK. 
Although studies of prisoner mobility are scarce, Svensson and Svensson (2006) have 
analysed the social consequences of the increasing mobility of Swedish inmates. They 
argue that the act of mobility is at once humiliating and dehumanising to those who are 
moved. By moving prisoners the authority of the mover is performed and enacted and the 
identity of the inmate as a subjugated body is reinforced. They also recognise the value of 
moving prisoners within a prison estate in terms of subduing prison populations and 
breaking cultural ties. 
 
[P]risoner transportation is an important part of the dynamics of the prison system. This 
is an obvious example of the distinctive nature of the role played by culture in neo-liberal 
forms of governance. Transferring prisoners is being used to maintain differentiation and 
security and to break the cultural rules and rituals that are establishing among the 
prisoner population. 
 
Svensson and Svensson, 2006, p2 
 
According to a series of HM Prison inspections of Campsfield House (HM Inspectorate 
of Prisons 2002; 2004; 2007; 2008), the movement of detainees within the removal 
centres of the UK have caused concern not only as they are carried out, but also through 
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the threat or possibility of movement in the minds of detainees. It appears from the 
emphasis placed in these reports upon the importance of preparing detainees to be 
released or transferred, which is seen as an important part of making them feel secure, 
that the process of movement and the anticipation of movement is very often profoundly 
stressful for detainees. That the practice of moving immigration detainees is becoming 
more common should therefore alert us to an emerging source of anxiety and confusion 
among detained asylum seeker populations in the UK. 
 
The Detention Escorting and Population Management Unit (DEPMU) is a central 
government agency that is responsible for placing immigration detainees in suitable 
holding facilities (Prison Service, 2008, sections 5.1 - 5.4). They have been under 
particular scrutiny since the mishandling of 1,023 foreign criminals in April 2006, who 
were released rather than considered for deportation following completion of their prison 
sentences (BBC News Online, 2006). They have received criticism from HM 
Inspectorate of Prisons for giving late notification of movements to detainees who are 
due to be moved, causing alarm among detainees (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2006, 
section 2.14). 
 
DEPMU are a key organisation because they arrange the transfer of detainees. While 
other, private companies are paid to do the actual work of transferring them DEPMU 
have the authority to ‘arrange for a detainee to be moved in order to meet local demands 
or to provide more secure accommodation’ (Immigration and Nationality Directorate, 
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2001a, section 38.10). At Campsfield, staff are able to request the movement of detainees 
to alternative centers via communication with the centre manager in the first instance, 
and, with the centre manager’s authorisation, via DEPMU. These movements are not for 
the purposes of deportation but simply to transfer detainees between incarceration 
facilities (Hayter, 2004). Troublesome detainees are more likely to be transferred. 
 
Source 12: If someone has raised complaints or has perhaps mobilised fellow detainees 
to put together a petition or something often you’ll find that they’re moved around, split 
up in some way and those who seem to be particularly vociferous seem to end up in 
some of the more secure centres. 
 
The extent of these movements has become a striking feature of the centre at Campsfield. 
While it is difficult to access official statistics concerning the number of asylum seeker 
movements via DEPMU, Tony McNulty, the then-minister for immigration, did respond 
to a parliamentary question about the number of intra-detention estate transfers, posed in 
2006. His response was as follows: 
 
The figures for the number of inter-detention estate transfers of immigration detainees 
in 1997–98 are not available. In 2001–02, there were 30,334 such transfers, in 2002–
03, 35,656; in 2003–04, 41,477 and in 2004–05, 54,670 … These statistics cover all 
inter-detention movements of detainees including those from prisons, police cells and 
port holding rooms into Immigration Removal Centres. 
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Tony McNulty MP (Hansard, 9th January 2006) 
 
Considering that the capacity of the detention estate is only just over 2500, these figures 
convey the fluency and constancy of detainee mobility. As a result, the average length of 
stay of detainees in Campsfield is reducing. 
 
Source 3: They’ve initiated a totally different regime which is that they don’t want to 
leave any detainees anywhere for any length of time. There are a few detainees in 
Campsfield that have been in there for a long time, but very few. They will come in and 
they will stay for 10 days and they will be moved to Harmondsworth or to Yarlswood or 
anywhere but it’s a moving process. The average stay at Campsfield now is 10 days. 
 
This means that individual asylum seekers often experience a variety of detention 
facilities. 
 
Source 8:  Before Campsfield House I stay long time I stay here for four detentions. 
NG:  Four different detentions? 
Source 8: Four different detentions. My first detention is Oakington. Oakington I stay here 
three days for Oakington. 
NG:  Yes 
Source 8: Four months five day in Harmondsworth 
NG:  Harmondsworth yes 
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Source 8: After Harmondsworth [name] bring me to Belmarsh prison 
NG:  Belmarsh 
Source 8: Belmarsh I stay maybe one month. After Belmarsh I think I stay in Dover. Dover 
detention two months four days. After Dover I go again to Harmondsworth one week. 
NG:  Yes 
Source 8: After Harmondsworth I come [name] bring me to Campsfield House 
NG:  Yeah so your total? 
Source 8: Maybe the total’s fifteen months in detention. 
 
The average price of moving a detainee from one location to another in 2005 was 
£119.50 (Hansard, 5th December 2005), meaning that the government spent over £6.5m 
in 2004/5 moving detainees around the detention estate. Moreover, the movements also 
entail significant secondary costs. One of my interviewees was responsible for organising 
classes for the detainees. 
 
Source 4: For a class, it’s impossible to get any sort of cohesion and move along as a 
group and make any sort of progress because you might start with 10 people in your 
group on a Monday and still have 10 at the end of the week but they’re completely 
different people - the turnover’s so high. 
 
Furthermore, there are detailed checking-in procedures for new detainees, including 
heightened observation, medical screening and a reception wing for the first forty-eight 
hours of stay, all of which experience increased demand due to the transfer of detainees. 
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Source 4: The centre manager’s actually complained about it because it’s very costly 
and it’s very time consuming. The facilities here, they were designed as a detention 
centre to have a much lower throughput. Now it’s a higher throughput, they’re having 
to deal with many, many more people every day checking them in and out. 
 
Nevertheless, despite their cost, the movements appear to be an effective part of the 
sanction and reward system. For the Campsfield detainees, moving to another centre is an 
unwelcome prospect because the conditions in Campsfield are widely regarded as 
relatively good. Detainees are allowed free association during most of the day, meaning 
that they can leave their rooms and move freely around the centre. There are also good 
recreational facilities and generally friendly relationships with staff. Other centers are not 
so accommodating. Some offer much poorer facilities, premises that were originally 
designed as prisons and detention custody officers who treat the detainees much more 
impersonally (Source 5). A former Campsfield detainees described how detainees would 
often be grateful to return to Campsfield. 
 
NG:  What did people think about that when they came back? 
Source 9: People is very, very content. Is OK. Maybe people is enjoy. Because I told you 
again - Campsfield House is better detention. 
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A governmentality-based analysis of detainee mobility focuses upon changes in the 
desires of the actors involved as a result of the movements. Source 9 provides a striking 
example of these effects. Through the selective differentiation of conditions within 
different removal centres, Source 9 has actually been induced to desire to be held within 
Campsfield. By making reference to the contentment he and other detainees felt upon 
arrival at Camspfield, the extent of the governmental influence of the mobility of 
detainees is thrown into relief. 
 
THE EFFECT OF DETAINEE MOBILITY UPON ASYLUM ADVOCATES 
 
It is certainly not the intention here to detract from the consequences that intra-detention 
estate movement holds for asylum seekers. They find the continual upheaval 
disorientating and dehumanising, as links to networks of fellow detainees, external 
supporters and even external lawyers and other sources of formal security are continually 
severed (Hayter, 2004). Nevertheless, with the objective of understanding why asylum 
sector activists and employees conduct themselves in the ways that they do, the aspect of 
intra-detention estate movement that concerns this paper is that which impacts upon these 
influential figures. 
 
Alongside the effects on the detainees themselves, the movement of asylum seekers 
around the detention estate both delimits the work that asylum advocacy organisations 
are able to do on behalf of the asylum seekers and undermines the basis of their 
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motivation to carry out work on asylum seekers’ behalf.  These two effects correspond, 
respectively, to the blunt effects of timing and spacing outlined in the introduction and 
the governmental aspect of mobility, that works upon desires, aspirations and ‘interests’. 
In the first instance, the legal support that the asylum advocacy community was able to 
deliver was impoverished as a result of the mobility of detainees. Legal advisers such as 
BID, as well as local lawyers, did not have the time to familiarise themselves with 
asylum seekers’ cases before they were moved. At the time of my research, BID 
volunteers were concentrating on creating self-help notebooks in a wide variety of 
languages that asylum seekers could take with them when they moved: 
 
Source 11: We have so many clients now we can’t possibly do even a small fraction of 
them. So BID has devised a system, we call it the notebooks, which explains to people 
the process of bail and how they can run their own bail hearing, how to list for it in the 
court, the timescale and we actually help them make the arguments for themselves. The 
idea is that they take these with them wherever they end up. 
 
Ideally, BID would make the applications for bail themselves but given the potentially 
limited duration of their interactions with each client, they have had to devise second-best 
alternatives. The ‘notebook’ solution is a direct response to the mobility of asylum 
seekers that delivers the responsibility for making a bail application back to individual 
detainees, who may be ill-equipped to formulate the sort of legal arguments that 
strengthen applications. 
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While it is clearly the case that the mobility of detainees has a blunt, direct impact upon 
the efficacy of asylum advocacy groups in terms of what they are able to achieve, the 
movement of detainees also undermines the motivation of these organisations, impacting 
not only upon what they can and cannot achieve, but upon what they want and do not 
want to achieve. In the case of the governmental impact of mobility, the difficulty of 
establishing a relationship with detainees had the specific effect of constricting the 
degree to which the advocacy community could secure bail. To achieve bail, an asylum 
seeker must be sponsored by two external guarantors, who are each required to put down 
financial deposits, so called ‘sureties’, that they will lose if the asylum seeker absconds. 
Additionally, they must be able to provide an address that they will stay at should they be 
granted bail. 
 
Source 11: Unless you’ve got accommodation to go to and at least one surety you’re 
very unlikely to get bail. 
 
It is often the case that the amount of deposit required to secure bail tests the degree of 
trust between the depositor, who is often simply a sympathetic member of the public. 
Although deposits are usually in the region of a few hundred pounds, they have been as 
high as two thousand pounds, at the discretion of the bail tribunal. 
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Source 2: Sureties vary a lot … Sometimes there are horrible situations where you go 
to court and the adjudicator tries to up the amount they offer in court in front of the 
detainees which is very hard on sureties. It used to, and probably still is, quite common 
to demand two sureties of £2,000 each. 
 
The strategy of demanding sureties puts pressure not only upon the actual ability of 
advocacy organisations to support detainees, but also their willingness to do so, 
providing one example of the way in which factors that undermine trust and reciprocity, 
such as intra-detention estate movement, can affect advocates’ behaviour. 
 
The requirement for bail applicants to be able to provide an address that they will stay at 
should they be released further illustrates the stress that is put upon relationships between 
advocacy groups and detainees by the latter’s constant movement. To secure bail 
detainees must show they have somewhere to reside during the period of their bail term. 
Providers of accommodation were often either private individuals or civil society 
organisations such as churches and convents. One priest described the way in which 
some asylum seekers who are frequently moved, both within and outside the detention 
estate under the UK’s dispersal program, can become detached from communities of 
support, making them targets for future transfers because no-one would be in a position 
to try to trace them or stop them being moved again. 
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Source 13: They should stop moving them around the country, which they do.  The 
number of times I’ve had to write panic letters saying you know you cannot move 
this person to the other end of the country because it destabilises them in terms of 
their mental health… 
 
NG: What reasons do they give for the movements? 
 
Source 13: They can be totally gratuitous. They have to go somewhere. Sometimes 
it’s totally gratuitous, there is no reason. 
 
NG: And when you’ve written how have they responded to that? 
 
Source 13: Well actually almost every time I’ve managed to stop the move. 
 
NG: Right, with a letter. 
 
Source 13: Yes.  But if people don’t have a community they’re attached to who 
actually cares about them as an individual then they’re just going to be moved 
because they will have no-one to speak on their behalf. 
 
It is reasonable to expect the willingness of civil society organisations to accommodate 
asylum seekers to vary in proportion to their familiarity with those wanting to be housed. 
Moving detainees regularly therefore directly undermines the basis of their goodwill, 
with important ramifications for transferred detainees. 
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The likelihood of forming meaningful relationships with detainees who are constantly 
moved is further reduced by the difficulty of visiting them. Although there are dedicated 
facilities to allow visitors and detainees to meet and interact within Campsfield, the 
process of visiting is difficult because visitors have to navigate demanding organisational 
procedures and undergo extensive security checks. Detainees must be known to the 
visitors before they receive a visit; appointments with named detainees must be booked 
twenty-four hours in advance. The constant movement of detainees means that visitors 
must navigate these organisational requirements on behalf of someone that they do not 
know and have not met before with increasing regularity. 
 
Source 5: It’s quite difficult to visit people, you have to book in advance you can’t 
just turn up. You have to have a named person and visiting is allowed from 2.00 till 
5.00 every afternoon and from 6.00 till 9.00 every evening. When you go in they check 
against your booking your name and who you’re visiting and you then have your 
photograph taken. Anything on you you have to leave in a locker except for like I 
always take in a notebook and pen, I usually take my diary for various reasons, phone 
numbers and things. I’ve had my diary removed from me though because it had a map 
of the underground in it. They don’t let you take your driving license in if it’s got a 
picture on it. 
NG:  Why? 
Source 5: Goodness knows. And then you get searched. You have to stand, take 
your coat off front and back. Only 10 people can be visited at one time. But I’ve often 
been when it hasn’t been at all well used. 
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This account tallies with criticism levied at the centre by HM Inspectorate of 
Prisons for employing a range of intrusive security measures: 
 
[T]he number of security measures taken for domestic visitors was 
disproportionate. These involved having a photograph taken, a biometric finger 
print check, an identifying arm band, completing a written form, producing 
photographic identification, a pat down search and an x-ray of property. 
 
HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2007, p14 
 
Given the strict regulation of visits enthusiasm for visiting detainees declines in the face 
of their constant movement. Even detainees with a number of supporters in one part of 
the country may be completely unknown at their new location: 
 
Source 14: Here in Campsfield a lot of the detainees will have people supporting them 
outside. They’ll have people in BID or Asylum Welcome or just friends or family that are 
helping them and obviously moving them to different detention centres disrupts all of 
that. No-one knows you’re there and there’s no-one you can get in touch with. 
 
This has prompted some of the asylum activists at Campsfield to try to trace detainees 
moved to a different centre. Describing this process, one activist outlined both the 
difficulty of doing this through the official channels and the consequent reliance upon the 
goodwill of individuals within detention estate. 
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Source 5: We ring Campsfield to speak to a client who was maybe there yesterday 
talking to us and they say ‘oh they’ve gone’. So we say ‘well have they been removed 
[i.e. deported] or have they just moved [i.e. transferred within the detention estate]?’ 
… Sometimes they won’t even tell you whether or not they’ve been deported. So we 
have to then trail through the immigration service route and they won’t answer 
anything on the phone, you have to fax. 
 
Tracing asylum seekers is important because it allows detainee support groups to co-
ordinate their efforts across the country and may go some way to alleviating the 
alienation of asylum seekers. The barriers to tracing detainees are therefore significant, 
meaning not only that supportive communities are lost to the detainees, but also that 
contact with detainees is denied to supporters. In these ways, the movement of detainees 
disturbs the relationship between them and their support networks, which are often a 
prerequisite for motivated support. To the extent that supporters’ dispositions towards 
detainees are to some degree determined by their contact with them, any factors that 
curtail this contact, including movement, can be seen to have the governmental effect of 
eroding supporters’ willingness to persevere with their support. 
 
THE EFFECTS OF MOBILITY UPON CENTRE STAFF 
 
The governmental effects of detainee movements are not confined to the activist sector. 
The management team at Campsfield includes roughly ten individuals who each have 
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responsibility for one aspect of the detainees’ welfare during their stay. Although they are 
a powerful and influential group, they are also subject to the governmental power that is 
exerted over them through the representation of the detainee population in their care. This 
is not to suggest that, in the absence of detainee movement, managers would consistently 
choose to help the detainees: the research gave evidence of a mixture of attitudes towards 
detainees among the management at Campsfield. Whatever goodwill does exist towards 
detainees, though, is systematically undermined by the continual mobility of asylum 
seekers. 
 
There are minimum standards of behaviour that are expected of all staff within 
Campsfield. The Detention Centre Rules (Immigration and Nationality Directorate, 
2001b) set out what is expected of detention centre officers, with emphasis placed upon 
their roles in protecting the well-being of detainees, maintaining vigilance about their 
physical and mental health, and encouraging their self-respect. Significantly, the rules 
also include objectives that custody officers should pursue that are measurable precisely 
in the dispositions of detainees themselves. Just as the good fathers that Foucault (1991) 
describes who possess the ability to imbue their children with the desire to conduct 
themselves in ways that the father deems appropriate, so detention custody officers are 
charged with the responsibilities to enlist the ‘willing co-operation’ of detainees under 
their authority (Detention Centre rules, Immigration and nationality Directorate 2001b, 
clause 45.5), and ‘encourage … a sense of personal responsibility’ (Ibid., clause 45.6). In 
this way custody officers within the detention estate are enlisted in the governmental 
project of eliciting the consent and co-operation of detainees. 
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As with any system as complex and politically contentious as the detention estate, the 
enforcement of the minimum requirements set out in the detention centre rules is 
challenging. To this end, HM Inspectorate of Prisons serves an important function as the 
primary means of accountability of the centre, and many of the pro-asylum seeker 
activists I came into contact with during this research were highly supportive of the 
Inspectorate’s work. Recent inspections of Campsfield House have been both announced 
and unannounced. There are, however, at least three difficulties with HM Inspectorate of 
Prisons’ work regarding Removal Centres. 
 
First, the name of the Inspectorate is unfortunate. Associating inspections directly with 
the prison service undermines efforts among removal centre staff to distinguish between 
removal centres and prisons. Second, some of my interviewees questioned the degree of 
influence the Inspectorate had. On the one hand, their remit was seen as relatively tight: 
 
Source 11: Their reports address four issues – detainees’ safety, the respect they 
received inside detention, the provision of purposeful activity for them, and 
adequate preparation for release or transfer. That’s four issues which leaves a great 
big space around them. I mean I quite understand when you have to structure what 
you’re doing but there are a lot of unanswered things. 
 
On the other hand, individual removal centres are not bound by the recommendations of 
the Inspectorate: 
 
Source 6: Unfortunately they can only make recommendations and most of those 
are ignored by [the contracting company in charge of Campsfield at the time the 
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statement was written]. As one officer said: “We don’t have to do what HMIP [Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons] says! 
 
A third difficulty with the Inspectorate system is the fact that their visits are infrequent. 
At Campsfield they occur roughly once every two years. A more regular form of 
monitoring is also provided by the ‘Independent Monitoring Board’, also known as the 
‘Visiting Committee’. This is an independent organisation composed of volunteer 
workers who have been trained explicitly for the role of up-holding standards of care and 
decency within prison and immigration removal establishments across the UK. Although 
the Campsfield monitoring board did not contribute to this research, they have produced 
annual reports detailing the financial, legal, infrastructural, social and security-related 
status of the centre for a number of years (see www.imb.gov.uk). Despite the obvious 
importance of their role, however, this organisation was criticised by my interviewees. 
First, my interviewees suggested that they were unaware of the practice of detaining 
immigrants whose cases had not come to an end: 
 
Source 2: A lot of people including the official visitors group, the so-called 
independent monitoring group, seem to think that the people who are there are either 
illegal immigrants or failed asylum seekers - people who are imminently going to be 
removed. I mean I don’t know what the exact proportions are but I’m sure that there 
always have been people in Campsfield who’ve been picked up at the airport so 
they’re not technically illegal. 
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Second, the group had caused consternation among some of the management at the centre 
because they had apparently not interviewed detainees thoroughly enough: 
 
Source 6: They are not competent and very ineffectual. They do not manage 
to protect human rights in the centre. Don’t talk to people about the right 
issues. Not on detainees wavelength. One can learn more by visiting and 
talking to a few detainees. 
 
Given the apparent flaws in the monitoring of places such as Campsfield, there is scope 
for individual members of staff to make life difficult or easy for the detainees in a number 
of ways. This point was illustrated to me most effectively through some of the challenges 
I experienced in accessing detainees of Campsfield. During this research, although a 
number of interviews were conducted at the centre itself, these were with centre 
managers and not detainees. It was strictly prohibited to record any conversation with the 
asylum seekers themselves. 
 
Due to the fact that the detainee population was exceptionally difficult to access, focus 
was concentrated upon gaining access to former detainees. It was this strategy that 
revealed the power and discretion wielded by the management. Two former Campsfield 
detainees were interviewed (Sources 8 and 9). Both of them owed their release 
exclusively to the support of a member of the management team at the centre. In one 
case, a very young detainee had been bewildered and confused during his incarceration, 
and one of the management had befriended him and taken up his case out of kindness. In 
another case, a detainee had attracted the attention of a manager who had decided to 
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‘stick his neck out’ in order to get the detainee released due to the respect he had for the 
detainee. Although these were clearly neither equitable nor regulated forms of 
intervention, the release of these two former detainees demonstrates the influence of 
Campsfield’s management, appearing to command a significant degree of influence over 
individual asylum seekers’ fortunes.  
 
The ability of staff to determine the experiences of individual detainees to such an extent 
prompted further enquires into their authority. According to a number of interviewees, 
management level staff in Campsfield have in the past used their discretion to support 
legal appeals, re-open legal cases, accompany asylum seekers to court, support bail 
applications, act as character references, prepare legal arguments, translate legal 
documents, secure good legal representation, deter poor or unscrupulous legal 
representation, allow transferred asylum seekers to be traced by friends and supporters 
and block the transfer of detained asylum seekers (Sources 4 and 6). One manager 
underscoring the discretion staff command: 
 
Source 7: We have been able to arrange for luggage to be collected, arranged new 
lawyers, medical appointments, phone cards, money for some being deported, 
clothes. We have provided for festivities and have a supply of Bibles, Q’urans and 
other faith literature to give away. We have contacted detainees’ families, and have 
put those being sent to NASS accommodation addresses of churches or refugee 
support groups where they can get help and advice. We have contacted 
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organisations such as Jesuit Refugee Service about those being deported so that 
they have some support on their return. 
 
Given the degree of influence wielded by management, the way in which detainees are 
presented to managers is of critical importance. Members of the centre’s management 
team need personal relationships with the detainees in order to provoke them into using 
their considerable discretion to provide support because this discretion often entails 
personal costs to them in terms of time, emotional investment and, sometimes, risk. The 
movement of detainees undermines their opportunity to forge meaningful attachments 
and support the asylum seekers they come into contact with. 
 
One of the centre managers interviewed (Source 4), for example, detailed the ways in 
which he used to be able to help the detainees under his authority but was less inclined to 
do so since the heightening of detainees’ mobility. I asked him whether he ever 
developed an emotional attachment to the detainees: 
 
Source 4: It’s less difficult now because the turnover’s so high. In the past someone 
would leave and you’d wonder ‘what happened to him?’ ‘I haven’t heard from him for 
months, I wonder if he’s still alive?’ But now the turnover is so high that the minute 
someone’s left there’s someone who’s arrived with just as big problems or just such 
nasty situations so there’s always someone else to help. Nasty as it sounds you very 
quickly forget the ones who’ve just left because you’re onto the next batch. You have to 
develop a sort of professional detachment whereby you listen to them sympathetically 
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at the time and help in any way you can. But when you leave you have to leave that at 
work. If you were to take it with you I think it would be a huge obstacle because you’d 
be useless to the next batch that come through. 
 
The transience of detainees means that this manager is unwilling to engage with them to 
the same extent as before the system of moving detainees came into force. While it would 
still be possible to track individual cases, the manager cites ‘professionalism’ and the 
needs of incoming detainees as justifications for not doing so. The moral sensibilities of 
the manager cause him to respond to the mobility of detainees by reducing the level of 
support offered. Consequently, he is far less likely to utilise his authority to support the 
detainees under his influence, for example in drafting letters of support or spending time 
explaining their legal situation. In this way, the relationship between managers and 
detainees is depersonalised as a result of the movement of detainees. 
 
The mobility of asylum seekers can be seen to exert governmental effects by presenting 
detainees in a particular, subjective way to those who have influence over them, 
undermining the basis for lasting relationships of support. As is the case with the asylum 
advocacy community associated with the centre, the mobility of the asylum seekers in 
Campsfield affects their relationship with the managers, making them appear fleeting and 
altering managers’ aspirations for the asylum seekers in their care. It is precisely through 
the alteration of managers’ and other member of staff’s dispositions towards the detainees 
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in their care that detainee mobility can be seen to exert governmental effects, not just 
upon the detainees but also over this ostensible powerful set of actors. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has argued that the increasing mobility of asylum seekers around the detention 
estate has significant implications for both the advocacy groups and professionals who 
hold influence over their experiences in the UK. By considering the ways in which the 
movement of asylum seekers depicts them in particular, subjective ways to those with 
influence over them, the paper has demonstrated one instance in which mobility has 
governmental effects. While the asylum advocates and staff at Campsfield were 
sometimes financially incentivised to act differently, at other times their mentalities 
towards the asylum seekers in their care altered as a result of the strategy of intra-
detention estate mobility that has been effected. This argument indicates one way in 
which geographical thinking about space and time can contribute towards recent 
sociological theorisations of mobility. A long pre-occupation with the representative 
effects of social spacings and timings (Lefebvre, 1991, Soja, 1989) combines with more 
recent theorisations concerning the governmental attributes of space (Huxley, 2007, 
Larner and Walters, 2004) to produce a critical standpoint from which to scrutinise 
mobility as a means of establishing and depicting the transience of subjects. 
 
 43 
The findings presented here are not intended to suggest that the movement of detained 
asylum seekers around the detention estate represents the only way in which asylum 
advocates and asylum system mangers are constructed. There are clearly influences 
proceeding from the largely negative and defamatory discursive construction of asylum 
seekers in the media (Kaye, 2001, Mollard, 2001). Moreover, the training of asylum 
sector managers has also been shown to constitute a powerful influence over the degree 
to which they are likely to pursue asylum seekers’ interests (Düvell and Jordan, 2003, 
Weber, 2003). Nevertheless, without wishing to deny the importance of these factors, it is 
the argument of this paper that the construction of actors who hold influence over asylum 
seekers is also achieved through the presentational effect arising from detainees’ 
mobility. 
 
A striking implication of the findings reported here relates to the objectivity and 
independence of influential figures in and around the detention estate. While the removal 
centre staff and asylum advocates discussed here are nominally autonomous, the effect of 
the mobility of their charges undermines their objectivity, suggesting that a clearer focus 
upon the malleability of ostensibly powerful actors within the immigration sector is 
appropriate. 
 
Finally, given the salience of the representative effects that the mobility of asylum 
seekers can engender within the populations that have authority over them, attention is 
drawn to the politics of mobility not only as an outcome but as part of a process of 
representation. Since mobility is active in structuring the social world in such a way as to 
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soften or obscure certain elements within it, with the attendant material effects that this 
entails, it is conceivable that certain factions will compete in order to monopolise this 
effect. In other words, control over mobility may offer more than simply control over 
movement, but also control over the perceptual implications that movement or inertia 
also entails (Cresswell, 2006). While there is no evidence to suggest that ‘the state’ 
(which is, in any case, an unhelpfully vague abstraction here) directly engages in the 
control of asylum seeker mobility for anything other than the immediate gains offered in 
terms of the control and subduing of the asylum seeker population, it is clear that political 
forces that seek to reduce the number of asylum seeker applications to the UK have 
indirectly benefited from the governmental advantages that this intra-detention estate 
mobility can offer through the representation of asylum seekers to those with influence 
over them in ways that are conducive to exclusionary uses, or non-uses, of this influence. 
It is not unreasonable to expect that the dividends of mobility arising from their 
presentational effects may come to form sufficient reason to pursue the monopoly of 
mobility further in the future. 
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